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Abstract
In this paper we analyze where value is added along supply chains on a sample of more than 2
million of rms in the European Union. We detect a non-linear U-shaped relationship between the
value added generated by rms and their position on a productive sequence, for which tasks at the
top and at the bottom show higher value added. Our ndings are in line with previous hypotheses
on the existence of a so-called smile curve, resumed by both business and economic studies and
discussed at length in international fora. Our results are robust to di¤erent empirical strategies for
exible functional forms. As far as we know, ours is the rst rm-level successful attempt to test
for value generation along supply chains. Further, we nd empirical support for a phenomenon of
domestic retention of value added by MNEs, which may prefer keeping at home the tasks at higher
potential to safeguard present and future competitive advantages. By country, intermediate stages
of production are at higher value when performed by foreign a¢ liates, whereas domestic producers
retain higher value at the very top and at the very bottom of the supply chain, organized either
as independent suppliers or as domestic a¢ liates. Although an economic theory is still missing
for explaining how and why value generation is non-linear along a typical technological sequence,
here we argue that a microfoundation with rm-level data is useful for understanding the growth
potential of countriesspecialization patterns along di¤erent segments of supply chains.
Keywords: global value chains, global supply chains, downstreamness, smile curve, downstream-
ness, value added, heterogeneous rms, multinational enterprises.
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1 Introduction
The organization of rms has experienced dramatic changes over the last decades, after technological
advances and reductions in trade costs triggered an unbundling of production tasks across national
borders (Baldwin and Lopez Gonzalez, 2015), therefore generating Global Value Chains (GVCs) which
encompass the full range of activities that are required to bring a good or service to the nal consumer
(Cattaneo et al., 2010). As Krugman et al. (1995) already stated, in times of worldwide economic
integration, goods are produced in a number of stages in a number of locations, adding a little bit of
value at each stage. Against this background, a ourishing literature identies the determinants of
the organization choices of the rms involved in supply chains (Antràs and Helpman, 2008; Acemoglu
et al., 2009; Antràs and Chor, 2013; Corcos et al., 2013; Del Prete and Rungi, 2015; Alfaro et al.,
2015; Amador and Di Mauro, 2015), in terms of vertical integration and geographic location when
production stages are included or not in the perimeter of corporate boundaries. The aim of this
strand of research is to assess the organization choices of supply chains, when the latter are dened
as technological sequences running from the idea of a product to the nal sale to consumers, going
through intermediate productive stages that may involve more than one input supplier in more than
one country. If the input is included in the perimeter of corporate boundaries, we have intra-rm
trade. If the input is sourced from an independent supplier, companies engage in arms length trade.
Stronger emphasis is instead given in other studies to the actual generation of value and potential,
both globally (Coe et al., 2008; Mudambi, 2008) and at a regional level (Pavlínek and µZenka, 2011;
Crescenzi et al., 2014), as deriving from the organization of rms in supply chains.
A di¤erent and contemporary strand of research started the study of GVCs from a another point
of view, when trying to reconcile gross trade data with national accounts (see among others Timmer
et al. (2015)). They start acknowledging the existence of a multiple accounting problem for gross
trade data, when fragmentation of production occurs, and intermediate goods and services cross
national borders more than once. Hence, they propose some decomposition methodologies (Johnson
and Noguera, 2012; Koopman et al., 2014; Los et al., 2016) to disentangle the truegeneration of value
that can be attributed to a single country-industry. Following the generation of value over time, it is
then possible to understand the changing patterns of country specialization and assess contribution
to economic growth (OECD, 2013; Costinot et al., 2013; Baldwin and Lopez Gonzalez, 2015; Taglioni
and Winkler, 2016; Del Prete et al., 2017). Yet, scholars from the latter strand of research are not
interested in a technological ordering of production stages, nor in the optimal design of corporate
boundaries that it would entail. Once adopting a looser denition of GVCs, they just try to trace the
generation of value added by all labor and capital inputs that are directly and/or indirectly needed
for the production of nal manufacturing goods.
In this contribution, we want to bridge the previous approaches proposing a microfoundation that
uses rm-level data on value added generation, information on the organization modes of GVCs, and
the relative position of each rm along the supply chain. Indeed, rm-level nancial accounts more
than often report information on value added, which has been relatively neglected until now as an
indicator for rm-level performance and contribution to growth. Eventually, the sum of value added
of all rms in a country makes up the GDP of that country. Value generated at the rm-level is the
original source from which a distribution of incomes to factors of production is possible under the
form of wages and salaries for workers, returns for capital, and nally taxation for public services.
Once corrected by size dividing by output, we do obtain the value added content for the activities of
the rm expressed in percentage as also suggested by Baldwin and Evenett (2015) and Baldwin et al.
(2014).
For a bridge across previous strands of research, we can indeed rely on the framework proposed by
Baldwin and Evenett (2015), who assume that the position of a task with respect to nal consumption
may entail a di¤erent implicit generation of value.1 Therefore, following anecdotal case and/or descrip-
tives derived from Input-Output tables (Baldwin et al., 2014), value seems to be more concentrated
at the top and at the bottom ends of the chain, where pre- and post-production services are located,
1The study of assembly lines is however nothing new to business and management literature, whether they fall within
or across national borders (e.g. Bartlett and Ghoshal (2000)).
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on an ideal curve running from concept, R&D and/or design through manufacturing and assembling
to marketing and after-sales services (Alcacer and Oxley, 2014). From the latter comes the name of
smile curve for a U-shape of value added plotted on the productive sequence. The notion was rst
developed in the 90s by the CEO of the Chinese Taipei-based hardware and electronics corporation
Acer, Stan Shih, who acknowledged that Acers focus on assembling PCs, i.e. in the middle of the
chain, was keeping the company in the least protable segment of the market (Shih, 1996). On a
more general basis, Baldwin and Evenett (2015) speculate that there could have been tilts in the
last decades of worldwide economic integration, such that production of intermediate components and
their assembly may entail less and less value over time, whereas pre-production and post-production
tasks may have increased their value generation for the nal sale of a product.
Unfortunately, we are not able to go back in time, when the unbundling by tasks across borders
started, and compare the shape of value generation. Nonetheless, we nd that the presence of a smiley
U-shape curve is systematic in our data for all rms located in the European Union in 2015, both when
we classify tasks by business functions, as in the original framework by Sturgeon (2008), and when
adopting the downstreamnessmetrics proposed by Antràs and Chor (2013), on the basis of input-
output usage. In both cases a distance from the nal consumption is eventually proxied, although with
greater detail at the 6-digit industry-level in the latter case. Exploiting parametric and semiparametric
approaches for plotting the generation of value added at the rm-level on downstreamness metrics,
we nd that the value is higher for tasks at the very top and at the very end of the supply chains,
even after controlling for rm heterogeneity and country characteristics, which however do a¤ect the
magnitude of value generation.
In fact, as expected, we also nd that more productive rms and a lower level of competition are
associated to a higher value added content at the rm-level. The results are similar also country by
country, with some exceptions in Eastern Europe.
Even more interestingly, we nd empirical support for a phenomenon of domestic retention of value
added when we control for the way companies organize on the supply chains. Activities at higher
value on the ends of the supply chain are preferably kept in the origin country and performed by
either independent buyers/suppliers not integrated in any MNEs, or by integrated domestic a¢ liates.
Foreign a¢ liates in the middle of the supply chain produce at higher value when compared to domestic
a¢ liates in the same stages of production. This phenomenon is particularly evident in the case of
New Member States (NMS) that entered the European Union after 2004. In this case the value along
the chain by foreign a¢ liates is no more a smiley but a at linear relationship, decreasing from
upstreamness to downstreamness stages.
By and large, the mechanisms through which value generation unevenly distributes on the supply
chain are still relatively unexplored. However, we argue, a microfoundation with rm-level analyses is
useful also to assess how countriesspecialization patterns on specic segments of the value chain can
a¤ect distribution of incomes, development and eventually economic growth.
2 Data construction and preliminary evidence
We collect rm-level data for companies operating in the European Union from ORBIS, a cross-
country database maintained by Bureau van Dijk, which originally sources nancial accounts from
various national registries.
For each rm included in our database, we are able to detect its value added content in production,
measured as a ratio between rm-specic added value and output (sales/turnover). Companies in our
sample also report the core industrial activity at the 4-digit level NAICS and NACE classications,
which we use as an indicator for relative positions on the supply chain.
At rst, we just reclassify manufacturing activities, separating between primary, intermediate and
nal goods, and service activities, separating between pre-production and post-production services.
In this we follow a more classical approach borrowed from anecdotal evidence and discussed originally
by Mudambi (2008) for a stylized versions of the smile curve.
Thereafter, we merge rm-level industrial activities with downstreamnessmetrics of supply chains
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sourced from Antràs and Chor (2013)2, according to which the relative location of an industry in
production processes is given by its usage in intermediate vs nal production. In absence of original
information on actual shipments, downstreamness metrics turn to input-output tables in order to
obtain positions of each industry on an ideal technological sequence. They are normalized on a range
[0; 1], where 0 ideally represents the start of a production line and downstream stages proximate to
1 represent goods/services destined to nal consumers. For sake of robustness, we exploit here both
alternative metrics provided by Antràs and Chor (2013) for downstreamness. The rst is built more
simply as a ratio of the aggregate direct use of an input to the aggregate total use of that industry
(DuseTuse), and the second is weighted for the average position of that industry in the supply chain,
counting back at which input distance an industrial output is used (DownMeasure).
Further, we derive the organization mode of each rm on the supply chain as follows. We assume
that a company is vertically integrated in a supply chain when a parent company controls directly
or indirectly the majority of its equity (>50%). On the contrary, we assume that a company is not
vertically integrated but it is part of (at least) a supply contract when no corporate entity has full
control of its stakes3, but it buys (sells) intermediate goods and services, which are sold (bought)
by other rms. A general classication between intermediate and nal goods is possible after we
convert NAICS industries in BEC (Broad Economic Categories) using correspondence tables from UN
statistics o¢ ces. As every producer of nal goods from our data is also a buyer of intermediate goods,
because it reports purchases of materials and services, we may always consider them as located at
the end of a supply chain. Similarly, producers of intermediate goods can be naturally considered
as suppliers of other companies, although we dont have information on which companies are nal
recipients of shipments.
Eventually, when focusing on vertically integrated a¢ liates, we can distinguish between domestic or
foreign-owned according to the country of origin of the parent company. In absence of actual shipments
among companies, we can reasonably assume that if a company produces or acquires intermediate
inputs, and it is not controlled by a parent, it can only originate arms length shipments, whether
destined and/or coming from companies located at home or abroad. That is, we can exclude that
non-a¢ liated companies can engage in intra-rm trade. On the other hand, we cannot exclude that
integrated companies actually producing or acquiring intermediate goods can be eventually engaged
both in intra-rm trade and arms length trade after signing supply contracts with companies outside
their own corporate boundaries.
In Tables 1 (see Table 6 in Table Appendix for country details) and 2, we report descriptive
statistics of our rm-level coverage by geography, industry and status. We end up with a sample of
2,296,848 companies with information on value added content in year 2015. Of these, about 18% are
rms operating in manufacturing industries and 60% are located in EU15.4
In Table 2 we further report that 44% of European companies in our sample are never integrated
under any parent company. Among a¢ liated/integrated companies, about 6% are foreign-owned
because a parent company is located abroad.
2Metrics for distance from the nal consumer, based on input-output tables, were rst proposed by Antràs et al.
(2012), and inspired by the e¤ort previously made by Fan and Lang (2000), where however no technological sequence
was derived for the relative position of industries along the supply chain.
3The direct or indirect corporate control of a¢ liates by parent companies follows international standards set for
example in OECD (2005) and UNCTAD (2011, 2009). For more details on previous usage of these data see also Rungi
et al. (2016), Altomonte and Rungi (2013) and Cravino and Levchenko (2016).
4Depending on specic rules by national regulatory bodies, some countries may still show an uneven coverage on
nancial accounts, mainly because they are required to submit complete balance sheets only after reaching a certain size
threshold, which can be di¤erent by country. It seems to be the case of Austria or Germany, for example, with a lower
number of companies reporting information on value added, whereas smaller countries like Portugal or Slovakia have
a higher coverage (Table 6). Concerns about possible sample selection by country and/or by size will be addressed in
following empirical analyses.
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Table 1: Geographic coverage
Manufacturing Services Total
EU15 266,983 1,118,750 1,385,733
NMS 131,092 780,023 911,115
Total 398,075 1,898,773 2,296,848
Table 2: Integration and foreign status
Integrated Non-integrated Total
Domestic 1,199,949 1,013,835 2,213,784
Foreign 83,064 0 83,064
Total 1,283,013 1,013,835 2,296,848
2.1 Visual test of a smiling curveby business functions
The smile curve can be presented in a graph with a Y-axis for value-added and an X-axis for supply
chain (Figure 1). Along the curve, activities can be broadly grouped into ve categories: the upstream
pre-production services, the downstream post-production services and the middle with primary, inter-
mediate and nal goods manufacturing activities. Activities at the upstream end generally comprise
R&D services, architectural and engineering services. Activities at the downstream end typically
comprise marketing, advertising, distribution and retail. Finally activities in the middle comprise
manufacturing, standardized service delivery and other repetitious processes in which commercialized
prototypes are implemented on a mass scale.
Figure 1: Value Chain (Mudambi, 2008)
In line with the pattern reported in Figure 1, as exemplied by Mudambi (2008) and discussed
from a qualitative point of view in OECD (2013), in Figure 2 we nd rst visual evidence for the
existence of a smile curve after ordering industrial activities at the rm-level over those ve business
functions.5
5The classication of manufacturing industries in primary goods, intermediate goods and nal goods is done accord-
ingly to correspondence tables provided by UN statistics o¢ ces.
However, no specic classication exists for pre-production services and post-production services. We propose here our
5
The median company in each business function is reported with a red line in each box of Figure
2. Pre-production services is the function where the median company has the highest value added
content in production. On the other extreme, post-production services have a median value added
content worth 53% of production value. Companies engaged in the production of intermediate inputs
show the lower median value added of 37%.
Despite a clear concavity in value generation, companies present a high dispersion in value added
content within business functions. It means that it is quite possible to nd R&D or distribution activ-
ities that generate less value than production of intermediate goods when we look at single companies,
in the interquartile distributions of single boxplots in Figure 2. Median values and dispersions are
indeed higher in pre and post-production services. More compressed is the distribution of value added
content by producers of intermediate goods, whose interquartile range falls between 23% and 53%,
whereas the most dispersed is the distribution of post-production services companies that fall in a
range between 29% and 81%. In Table 3 we further report an estimate of premia by least squares,
after considering the intermediate production as a control group, in which we do conrm the ordering
of Figure 2. Companies engaged in pre- and post-production services report on average a value added
content that is respectively 18.9% and 13.4% than production of intermediates. Primary and nal
goods have a weakly signicant premium on intermediates of about 3.1% and 4.8%.
Figure 2: First visual test of a smiling curveby business functions
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own, when a service is unambiguously used before or after the manufacturing of a product. R&D services, architectural
and engineering services are example of pre-production services. Marketing, advertising, distribution and retail can be
uniquely attributed to post-production. However, some of them can be actually demanded in di¤erent moments of the
production process, as for example in the case of logistics or warehouse storage when exploited by intermediate producers.
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Table 3: Value added content premia vs production of intermediates
Business function
pre services 0.189***
(0.020)
primary goods 0.031*
(0.018)
final goods 0.048*
(0.026)
post services 0.134***
(0.024)
Premia in value
added content
Note: OLS estimates with intermediates
as control group. Number of companies:
613,935. *,**,*** stand respectively for
p<0.100, p<0.050 and p<0.001.
3 Empirical strategy
The heterogeneity we nd within business functions in Figure 2 may be actually explained by specic
country, industry and rm-level characteristics. Moreover, our classication by business functions
may be just an oversimplication, as tasks like these are more easily identied when studying single
corporate case studies, where higher detail is available for the exact contribution of each function on
a rm-level supply chain.
This is the reason why from now on we challenge the existence of the smile curve in two ways.
We rst introduce an alternative and more detailed measure of position along the supply chain, given
by the downstreamness metrics provided by Antràs and Chor (2013), then we introduce a multivariate
strategy for possible rm-level drivers of value added.
A quadratic t and robustness checks for the functional forms are tested respectively in Section
3.1 and 3.2. In Section 3.3 we di¤erentiate by rm-level organization modes of GVC and European
geography.
3.1 Quadratic t
We start by estimating the following equation:
value_added
output

ijc
= 0 + 1Xj + 2Zi + c + "ijc (1)
where the dependent variable is the ith rm-specic value added content active in industry j and
located in country c, which we calculate as the ratio of value added on production value as reported in
nancial accounts. The term Xj collects proxies for positions along the supply chain with a quadratic
term, on the basis of the jth activity performed by the single rm. It will include alternatively
downstreamness metrics (and squared terms). The term Zi collects rm-level controls and c is a set
of country xed e¤ects for each of the EU members in which the rm may be located. Standard errors
are clustered by 4-digit industries.
In Table 4, we report OLS estimates with downstreamness metrics by columns, respectively in the
simple (DuseTuse) and weighted versions (DownMeasure). We nd that the value added content is
more than proportionally higher for rms that are located at the top and at the bottom of the supply
chain, i.e. a quadratic t is detected for value added generation on downstreamness metrics, taking
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the shape of a U-curve with a minimum on production of intermediate goods. The nding is robust
to the inclusion of rm-level controls and change in downstreamness metrics.
In Figure 3 we report the quadratic t of the second and fourth column for rm-level value added
content along supply chains. We conclude that the test for a smiling curveis robust after: i) exploiting
a more detailed proxy for distance from nal consumption; ii) controlling in the empirical strategy for
rm-level heterogeneity, levels of competition and country characteristics.
Eventually, the graphs in 3 are much smoother than the one we depict in Figure 2 by business
functions. In fact, rm-level controls do catch a good share of heterogeneity in value added content
at the rm-level.
As expected, more capital-intensive rms correlate with a lower value added content in production,
whereas more productive, younger and smaller rms tend to generate more value. The latter is indeed
the case of services rms that systematically generate higher value.
The inclusion of a control for price-cost margin is pivotal in checking for the presence of rm-
specic rents embedded in the generation of value added. Indeed, it seems quite possible that part
of it could be explained by a lack of competition in the specic market where the rm operates. The
correlation of price-cost margins and value added content is weakly positive.
Interestingly, we nd scope for a phenomenon of domestic retention of value added. We systemat-
ically nd that higher value production stages are preferably located in the origin country of a MNE.
This nding is robust also when we control for productivity of rms.
The latter nding is much clear when we observe the tted values from Figure 5. Although foreign
intermediate producers are on average producing at higher value, the activities at highest value on
the extremes of the distribution are mostly located in the origin country, whether they are integrated
under the management of a parent or they are independent company (i.e. non-integrated stages)
participating to GVCs as buyer/suppliers. Further analyses are needed to understand the channels
through which such a distribution and retention of value added is possible.
In Table Appendix, we also report the post-estimation t of eq. 1 for each country included in
our sample, where di¤erent smilingshapes are found although with some exceptions due to uneven
coverage of smaller countries.
Figure 3: Quadratic t of rm-level value added content on downstreamness metrics
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Table 4: Least squares results
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
value added content OLS OLS OLS OLS
duse -0.408* -0.633**
(0.232) (0.307)
duse^2 0.401** 0.567**
(0.201) (0.244)
down -1.071*** -0.933**
(0.386) (0.398)
down^2 0.830*** 0.719**
(0.304) (0.316)
(log of) capital intensity -0.026*** -0.026***
(0.004) (0.004)
(log of) size -0.008** -0.008**
(0.004) (0.004)
(log of) age -0.014*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.003)
(log of) productivity 0.083*** 0.081***
(0.005) (0.005)
price-cost margin 0.004* 0.004*
(0.002) (0.002)
foreign affiliate -0.069*** -0.070***
(0.009) (0.009)
integrated stage -0.028*** -0.030***
(0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.554*** 0.053 0.735*** 0.177
(0.064) (0.103) (0.118) (0.144)
Observations 2,026,364 1,393,798 2,026,364 1,393,798
R-squared 0.006 0.240 0.011 0.241
Country dummies NO YES NO YES
Errors clustered by 4-digit industry YES YES YES YES
Clustered standard errors by industry. *,**,*** stand respectively for
p<0.100, p<0.050 and p<0.010.
3.2 Robustness for alternative functional forms
In this section we check whether the smile curve is robust to alternative specications that are more
exible for alternative functional forms.
We start testing a generalized linear model (GLM) in the form:
E
"
value_added
output

ijc
=Xj ; Zi; c
#
= G (0 + 1Xj + 2Zi + c) (2)
where alternatively the G()0s are known functions that satisfy 0 < G(s) < 1 for each s. As in
previous tests, the value added content of a company is tested against Xj that collects downstreamness
metrics and their powers, whereas the term Zi collects rm-level controls and c is a set of country
xed e¤ects.
As Papke and Wooldridge (1996) demonstrated, when the dependent variable is a share the linear
regression model may yield incorrect predictions, especially for values that are extreme on the dis-
tribution of regressors. It is our specic case, for a dependent variable expressed as a ratio and an
empirical test where the contribution of extreme values of the distributions is much important.
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We pick the fractional response regression model among the family of GLM models for its ability
to plot on a bounded (fractional) dependent variable, in line with Papke and Wooldridge (1996). In
Table 5 we report results separately assuming that the G() is a logistic or a probit, with both metrics
of downstreamness. A quadratic t for a smiling curve along the supply sequence is statistically
signicant also when we control for the functional form on the left hand side of the eq. 2. Signs for
rm-level controls are all in line with previous results from Table 4, although we may conclude that
rm size is not signicantly correlated anymore with value added content.
Table 5: Fractional response (GLM) model - Probit and Logit family functions
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (1) (2)
value added content
Fractional
Logit
Fractional
Logit
Fractional
Probit
Fractional
Probit
duse -2.563** -1.676**
(1.187) (.082)
duse^2 2.355** 1.504**
(0.942) (0.648)
down -3.634** -2.489**
(1.597) (1.068)
down^2 2.837** 1.924**
(1.264) (0.846)
(log of) capital intensity -0.130*** -0.122*** -0.072*** -0.071***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010)
(log of) size -0.009 -0.012 -0.019* -0.018*
(0.016) (0.015) (0.011) (0.010)
(log of) age -0.049*** -0.050*** -0.039*** -0.039***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008)
(log of) productivity 0.316*** 0.309*** 0.234*** 0.229***
(0.028) (0.027) (0.016) (0.015)
price-cost margin 0.869*** 0.682*** 0.014* 0.013*
(0.143) (0.139) (0.07) (0.007)
foreign -0.308*** -0.298*** -0.196*** -0.198***
(0.038) (0.037) (0.025) (0.024)
integrated stage -0.140*** -0.137*** -0.078*** -0.081***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007)
Constant -2.181*** -1.690*** -1.568** -1.228***
(0.422) (0.596) (0.281) (0.391)
Observations 1,393,798 1,393,798 1,393,798 1,393,798
Pseudo R-squared 0.062 0.061 0.056 0.061
Log pseudo likelihood -891488.07 -892133.51 -896482.12 -896373.47
Country fe YES YES YES YES
Errors clustered by 4-digit industry YES YES YES YES
Clustered standard errors by industry. *,**,*** stand respectively for p<0.100,
p<0.050 and p<0.010.
Finally, we check if a polynomial di¤erent from a quadratic t can be found after adopting a
so-called fractional polynomial regression model6, which simply searches among di¤erent powers the
polynomial that best ts the sample. After controlling for the same rm-level characteristics and
country xed e¤ects as in eq. 2, we obtain the fractional polynomial t reported in Figure 4. The
shape of the second panel has still a curvature similar to Figure 3, although the rst panel reports a
small segment of convexity at rst, which reduces the estimated value contribution of activities at the
6See Royston and Altman (1994) and Sauerbrei and Royston (1999) for further details on the procedure and motivation
of its application.
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top of the supply chain, making the gurative smile appear more as a snigger.
All in all, we can conclude that a quadratic t is a good approximation of the smile curveand
we can consider the estimates in 4 and 5 as valid for the scopes of our analyses.
Figure 4: Post-estimation t of rm-level value added content on downstreamness metrics after frac-
tional polynomial regression
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a) Post-estimation t of a third-degree polynomial on eq. 2,
after fractional polynomial response strategy, statistically
signicant at p<.001.
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b) Post-estimation t of a second-degree polynomial on eq.
2, after fractional polynomial response strategy, statistically
signicant at p<.001.
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4 Smile Curveand organization modes: European Union, EU15
and NMS
In this section we distinguish three di¤erent organization modes from our rm-level data and compare
their generation of value along the supply chain: i) independent buyers and/or suppliers are rms that
acquire and/or sell intermediate materials or services without belonging to any corporate boundary,
i.e. they dont have a parent company; ii) domestic integrated rms and iii) foreign integrated rms,
depending if the origin country of the parent is the same or di¤erent from the one where they operate.
Since we dont have actual shipments of products and delivery of services, we may never know which
are the partner rms, and where they are located. Yet we may assume that integrated a¢ liates deliver
and/or receive part of their intermediate production/demand from within the corporate boundary. On
the other hand, an independent buyer/seller of intermediate inputs can only trade at home or abroad
with other independent companies, at arms length. The headquarters of foreign companies can come
from any country inside or outside the European Union.
Given baseline eq. 1, we derive the following post-estimation graphs, to test whether value gen-
eration is di¤erent along supply chains by organization mode. From our data, we do observe that a
slightly negative di¤erence exists in generation of value between domestically integrated a¢ liates and
independent buyers/suppliers, which is in line with the coe¢ cients shown in Tables 4 and 5. However,
it is worth noting the case of the foreign integrated a¢ liates that show a dramatically di¤erent shape
for value generation on supply chains.
Intermediate foreign producers in the EU that are part of MNEs have a systematic positive pre-
mium with respect to domestic producers, whether independent or vertically integrated by domestic
a¢ liates. However, at the very top and at the very bottom of the supply chain we do have that
domestic producers on average outperform foreign producers in value added generation. The nding
is systematic for every econometric procedure we tested until now. For sake of simplicity we report
only one of the two alternative metrics provided by Antràs and Chor (2013).
At this stage of the analyses, two plausible explanations are possible for this nding.
It makes sense that MNEs prefer retain in the origin country those production stages that make
a di¤erence for their present and future competitive advantages. Innovative ideas can come from
the top of the chain, as in the case of R&D or manufacturing design. The logistics, the distribution
network, marketing and advertising strategies are crucial for catching and maintaining customers and
are probably more e¢ ciently managed from the headquarters.
Yet its also possible that foreign intermediate producers do source from local (non-integrated)
suppliers for production stages that are at the top and/or at the bottom of the supply chain.
Unfortunately, in absence of intra-rm transactions we cannot understand which is the strategy
within MNEs that prevails. In either case, on a country basis, the main source of value for the very
initial and nal production stages are domestic producers.
Interestingly, we obtain di¤erent shapes for the case of foreign integrated a¢ liates, when in Table
6 we separate rms located in NMS in the European Union since 2004 from the ones in old EU15
Members before that date. First of all, the curves of EU15 are shifted upwards. That is, we register
on average a higher value content in EU15 for a representative rm at each production stage and
for each organization mode. Also, the di¤erence between independent companies and domestically
integrated rms narrows and often becomes not statistically signicant along the whole distribution.
Eventually, we nd that foreign companies in NMS have a atter and almost linear generation of value
added along the supply chain, decreasing in downstreamness. That is, foreign producers that are more
proximate to nal demand in NMS generate less value than upstream foreign producers. On the other
hand, in NMS the di¤erence between domestic buyers and producers at the very top and at the very
bottom of the supply chain is much greater in magnitude, even if similar producers in EU15 generate
on average more value in the same downstreamness position.
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Figure 5: Participation mode, value generation and supply chains in the European Union
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Figure 6: Participation mode, value generation and supply chain in EU15 and NMS
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a) EU15 - postestimation quadratic ts as from eq. 1 of
value generation on supply chain at 95% level of statistical
signicance.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper we tested at the rm-level the generation of value along supply chains on a unique
sample of more than 2 million companies active in the European Union in year 2015. We found
robust empirical evidence for the existence of a so-called smiling curve, in line with what discussed in
anecdotal business cases (Mudambi, 2008; Alcacer and Oxley, 2014), then usefully resumed by Baldwin
et al. (2014) and discussed in international fora (OECD, 2013) for the important policy implications
that it entails.
We do nd that the generation of value-added is indeed concentrated at the top and at the bottom
of a supply chain, even after controlling for several functional forms and for rm-level heterogeneity
and country characteristics. With few exceptions, single EU countries show a similar pattern of value
generation.
Further, we nd empirical support for a phenomenon of domestic value added retention, since pro-
duction stages on the extremes of the supply chain, where value is higher, are preferably kept in the
origin country and performed by either independent buyers/suppliers or domestic a¢ liates. It makes
sense that companies prefer to keep at home activities, like R&D laboratories, brand management
and other headquarter services, in order to safeguard their present and future competitive advantages.
However, there may be implications at a macro-level, since countriesspecialization patterns on seg-
ments of the supply chain at higher (lower) value do imply also higher (lower) distribution of incomes
by country and an uneven distribution of benets from participation to supply chains.
Eventually, we argue, the channels for which such a concentration of value added occurs on the
extremes of a supply chain are still largely unexplored. More work is needed from theory and empirics
to understand the origin of the smiling curveand its evolution over time.
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A Data Appendix
Value added content: computed at rm-level from Orbis database. It is the value added (sales
- material costs) over operating revenue.
Downstreamness: computed by Antràs and Chor (2013) from the 2002 U.S. IO Tables, after
using the detailed Supplementary Use Table after conversion tables issued by the BEA 2002, to obtain
average measures of the relative position of each industry in U.S. production processes. Antràs and
Chor (2013) propose two measures of downstreamness. The rst measure is the ratio of the aggregate
direct use to the aggregate total use (DUseTUse) of a particular industry is goods, where the direct
use for a pair of industries is the value of goods from industry i directly used by rms in industry j
to produce goods for nal use, while the total use is the value of goods from industry i used either
directly or indirectly in producing industry js output for nal use. A high value of DUseTUse thus
suggests that most of the contribution of input i tends to occur at relatively downstream production
stages close to nal demand. The second measure of downstreamness (DownMeasure) is a weighted
index of the average position in the value chain at which an industrys output is used, with weights
given by the ratio of the use of that industrys output in that position relative to the total output
of that industry. These measures have been matched with the 4-digit NAICS rev.2007 parent and
a¢ liate primary activities.
Capital intensity: computed from Orbis database. It is the ratio between xed assets over
number of employees in log.
Age: computed from Orbis database. It is the age of the rm in log.
Size: computed from Orbis database. It is the number of employees in log.
Productivity: computed from Orbis database. It is the value added over number of employees
in log.
Price-cost margin: computed from the Orbis database. It represents the level of competition,
dened as: [operating revenue - (cost of material + costs of employees )]/ operating revenue].
Foreign: computed from the Orbis database. It is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the rm i is a
foreign owned a¢ liate and 0 otherwise.
Integrated stage: computed from the Orbis database. It is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
rm i is a a¢ liated/integrated under the management of a parent company and 0 otherwise.
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B Table Appendix
Table 6: Geographic coverage by country
Country Final goods
Intermediate
goods Services firms Total
(A) (B) (C) (A+B+C)
Austria 165 144 1,753 2,062
Belgium 1,365 1,114 13,440 15,919
Bulgaria 15,705 12,962 180,828 209,495
Cyprus 15 14 68 97
Czechia 5,833 3,919 48,389 58,141
Germany 740 642 6,225 7,607
Denmark 584 462 3,760 4,806
Estonia 3,089 2,235 35,160 40,484
Spain 29,636 21,156 347,939 398,731
Finland 5,620 3,817 43,320 52,757
France 26,270 19,870 117,721 163,861
United Kingdom 6,023 4,932 34,725 45,680
Greece 1,132 981 7,807 9,920
Croatia 5,107 3,702 53,558 62,367
Hungary 1,467 1,250 10,592 13,309
Ireland 134 122 1,849 2,105
Italy 53,215 40,895 333,987 428,097
Lithuania 457 403 3,524 4,384
Luxembourg 7 5 32 44
Latvia 3,373 2,380 60,260 66,013
Malta 18 14 20 52
Netherlands 167 143 1,468 1,778
Poland 3,719 2,897 1,549 8,165
Portugal 17,912 14,177 193,959 226,048
Romania 22,912 19,283 262,944 305,139
Sweden 7,649 5,099 13,570 26,318
Slovenia 7,357 4,680 42,275 54,312
Slovakia 5,556 4,121 79,480 89,157
Total 225,227 171,419 1,900,202 2,296,848
18
Figure 7: Quadratic ts by country of value added content on downstreamness (DuseTuse)
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Figure 8: Quadratic ts by country of value added content on downstreamness (DownMeasure)
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.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
va
lu
e 
ad
de
d 
co
nt
en
t
.2 .4 .6 .8 1
Downstreamness
PORTUGAL
.6
.6
5
.7
va
lu
e 
ad
de
d 
co
nt
en
t
.2 .4 .6 .8 1
Downstreamness
ROMANIA
.4
.4
5
.5
.5
5
va
lu
e 
ad
de
d 
co
nt
en
t
.2 .4 .6 .8 1
Downstreamness
SWEDEN
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
va
lu
e 
ad
de
d 
co
nt
en
t
.2 .4 .6 .8 1
Downstreamness
SLOVENIA
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
va
lu
e 
ad
de
d 
co
nt
en
t
.2 .4 .6 .8 1
Downstreamness
SLOVAKIA
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